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In March 2014, the approximately two mil-
lion people living in the Ukrainian peninsula 
of Crimea were ‘reunified’ with Russia.1 The 
international community responded by plac-
ing sanctions on Russia to persuade the state 
into changing its policy toward Crimea and 
Ukraine.  Sanctions are a tool used by states 
and intergovernmental bodies typically de-
signed to “coerce, deter, punish, or shame en-
tities that endanger their interests or violate 
international norms of behavior”.2 However, 
the sanctions do not appear to have caused 
any change in Russia’s foreign policy actions 
to date. This begs the question; how might 
one best understand Russian foreign policy 
decision-making concerning Crimea and their 
response to the retaliatory economic sanctions? 
To examine this, I use expected utility theory 
and prospect theory – two psychological theo-
ries that have been adapted to economics and 
international relations.  Following a discussion 
of each theory and the explanation each offers 
for decision-making behavior, I apply each 
theory to pertinent speeches and events to 
investigate which theory offers the best expla-
nation for Russian foreign policy decision-mak-
ing.  Ultimately, I conclude that prospect 
theory offers the best framework for under-
standing Russian foreign policy decision-mak-
ing behavior vis-à-vis Crimea and the economic 
sanctions. An improved understanding of how 
states make decisions with respect to sanctions 
is useful in contributing to the overall debate 
about whether sanctions are an effective tool to 
provoke change from other states.
Background
On March 16, 2014, in a referendum con-
demned by the West as illegitimate, 97% of 
voters in Crimea voted to secede from Ukraine 
and join the Russian Federation. Following the 
referendum, leaders of Western states, includ-
ing the U.S. and EU member states, warned 
Russian President Vladimir Putin against 
absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation 
and imposed a travel ban and asset freezes 
on key Russian officials to deter such action. 
Despite the warnings and outrage at potential 
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, President 
Putin signed a bill to annex Crimea into Russia 
on March 18, 2014.3 Official sanctions on Russia 
soon followed from the EU, US, and a host of 
other countries, including Australia, Iceland, 
Japan, and Norway. Many of these countries 
are Russia’s largest trading partners.4
 States have since scaled up the sanc-
tions several times in addition to blacklisting 
several senior Russian officials and select com-
panies. These sanctions specifically target the
1,Macias, Amanda. “A Detailed Look at How Russia Annexed Crimea,” Business Insider (2015): n.p.
2Masters,Johnathan. “What are Economic Sanctions,” Council on Foreign Relations (2015): n.p.
3 “Ukraine Crisis Timeline,” BBC News (2015): n.p., accessed November 12, 2015.
4Dreyer, Iana and Nicu, Popescu. “Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?” European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2014, 1.
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businesses and people closest to decision-mak-
ing power in Russia. The main focuses are 
state finances, oil firms, and the arms sector. 
The EU and US also chose to target specific 
individuals and companies with connections to 
President Putin’s inner circle.5 Overall, sanc-
tioning states aim to place sanctions severe 
enough that they will encourage a change in 
Russian policy, but narrow enough that they 
harm those closest to Russian decision-making 
power rather than the average Russian. These 
sanctions have contributed to the current po-
litical and economic climate confronting deci-
sion-makers in Russia today.
Theory
The implementation of these sanctions has 
sparked a debate over whether sanctions work, 
and more narrowly, whether sanctions work on 
Russia. This debate revolves around two cen-
tral themes: the extent of economic impact on 
Moscow and whether the sanctions are enough 
to change Russia’s behavior.6 However, an exam-
ination of Moscow’s view towards the sanctions 
is missing from this discussion. It is important 
to understand the Russian perspective, since 
the real decision-making power for change rests 
with Moscow. This section, therefore, offers two 
theories that may be useful in understanding 
Russian decision-making behavior with respect 
to the economic sanctions. The fundamental 
point of contention within these theories revolves 
around the idea of rational choice.
Expected Utility Theory 
One theory that may help explain Russian 
foreign policy decision-making behavior with 
respect to economic sanctions is expected utility 
theory (EUT). EUT assumes two fundamental 
aspects about decision makers. First, it accepts 
that actors are rational, and therefore make log-
ical decisions to maximize their benefit. Second, 
EUT assumes that actors consider the proba-
bility of possible outcomes. When dealing with 
uncertain outcomes, EUT states that decision 
makers will consider various options based on 
each option’s expected utility.7
There are five central axioms that sum up the 
core of EUT:
1.Decision makers are rational. Actors order
various outcomes in terms of preferences.
2.This order of preferences is transitive
Actors will rank preferences so that A is a
more favored outcome than B, which the
actor prefers to C, D, E, and so forth. If the
cost of preference A outweighs its benefits, a
rational actor would choose option B. 
3.Decision makers know the subjective
value, or the utility, of their actions. 
4.Actors consider outcomes through exa
ining both the utility of the outcome and the
probability of success. 
5.Decision makers always select the optio
with the greatest expected utility.
5“How far do EU-US sanctions on Russia go?” BBC News (2014): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
6Dreyer and Popescu, “Do Sanctions against Russia work?,” 1. 
7Mongin,Philippe. “Expected Utility Theory,” in Handbook of Economic Methodology, edited by John. B. Davis, D. Wade Hands, 
and Uskali Mäki (Edward Elgar, London, 1997): 342.
8Bueno, Bruce de Mesquita, “The Contribution of Expected-Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,” in Handbook of 
War Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky (Routledge, New York, 1989): 144.
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This theory is consistent with the logic behind 
implementing economic sanctions. The sanction-
ing party or parties inherently assume the
rationality of the target and that negotiations 
will follow the sanctions, eventually leading to 
a desired goal.9 In the realm of economic deci-
sion-making, the most important consideration is 
considering short-term financial prospects when 
deciding whether to take a risk for a long-term 
financial gain.10
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (PT) emerged as an alternative 
to EUT in 1979. Rather than rationally consid-
ering the utility and probability of an outcome, 
PT posits that actors make decisions from a per-
sonal reference point and fear losses more than 
gains, even when each outcome has the same 
probability of occurring.11
There are six major tenets to PT:
1. Individuals think in terms of gains and
losses of a decision from a reference point
rather than the net outcome. 
2. Actors think about gains and losses 
diffeently. Decision-makers are less likely to
take risks for potential gains and more
likely to take risks to prevent loss. 
3. Actors dislike losing possessions more
than they like winning a similar thing they do
not possess (loss aversion). This tendecy to
over-value possessions is the endoment effect. 
4. Since actors make decisions from a 
refe ence point, the framing of a problem is
criical. Framing is the interpretation of a 
siuation that a decision-maker uses to 
respond to events. Framing a situation 
interms of loss makes the situation direr,
due to loss aversion. 
5. Decision-makers tend to overweight
small probabilities and underweight 
high probabilities. 
6. Decision-makers tend to simplify choices,
cancelling out options that seem similar.12
Generally, PT argues that decision-makers 
consider options from their own reference 
point, fear loss, and frame prospective choices 
in terms of gains or losses. Figure 1 represents 
the relationship between loss aversion and 
framing. When actors frame a potential out-
come with high probability as a loss, they are 
more likely to take risks than a high-probabil-
ity potential outcome in the domain of gains. 
This is because decision-makers are desperate 
to avoid significant losses. The opposite is true, 
however, in a low-probability situation.
Analysis
To understand whether either expected util-
ity theory or prospect theory offers a helpful 
framework for understanding Russian
9Hakimdavar,Golnoosh. A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law, and Development 
(Routledge, New York, 2013): 136.
10Briggs, Rachel. “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, editied 
by Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University, Stanford, 2015): n.p.
11McDermott, Rose. Risk Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (University of Michigan 
Figure 1
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decision-making behavior in relation to the eco-
nomic sanctions in retaliation to the annexation 
of Crimea, I apply the major tenants of each 
theory to key speeches and events. This inves-
tigation, while limited by the knowledge avail-
able regarding the Russian decision-making 
process, shows that prospect theory provides 
the better explanation.
Applied Expected Utility Theory
There are several aspects that one would expect 
to see while using EUT as a framework to un-
derstand Russian foreign policy decision-making 
in response to the economic sanctions. Among 
these are the consideration of alternate outcomes 
with respect to preferences and the probability 
of each outcome occurring, the perusal of actions 
in order of favored outcomes, and for Russia to 
always choose the outcome that will yield the 
highest utility. Most importantly, EUT expects 
that Russia will always rationally weigh the 
probability of success and the utility of a poten-
tial outcome before choosing an action.
 Does Russia meet these benchmarks? 
While it is impossible to truly know everything 
President Putin and his advisors considered 
when choosing whether to annex Crimea, one 
can make observations about the utility of 
Crimea to Russia. Fischer and Rogoza outline 
the benefits of the annexation: strengthening 
support for Vladimir Putin, natural gas and 
crude oil reserves, ownership of the Crimean 
tourist infrastructure and other industries, and 
broad access to the Black Sea.13 While it is true 
that the annexation did boost Mr. Putin’s ap-
proval rating, it is important to note that it was 
also very high before the annexation. Since 2000, 
his approval ratings have fluctuated between 
60% and 90%.14 Putting this in perspective, Pres-
ident Putin’s lowest approval ratings are still 
higher than President Obama’s highest approv-
al ratings.15 He did not need to annex Crimea 
to save approval rating because it was never 
in jeopardy. Similarly, Russia does not need 
Crimea for oil or natural gas reserves. Russia is 
already the world’s second highest producer of 
fossil fuels, and estimates suggest Russia ac-
counts for more than 80% of the world’s energy 
supply and has a 455-year supply of coal.16 
Russia in no way needs to depend on Crimea for 
energy resources.
 Additionally, the annexation itself spoiled 
much of the benefit Russia could have received 
from Crimean industry. Industry in Crimea 
has suffered, especially tourism, and more than 
three-quarters of the region’s international 
investments have pulled out of the area.17 More 
access to the Black Sea, nonetheless, does still 
provide Russia with some utility for military 
infrastructure. However, the vast majority of the 
identified benefits to acquiring Crimea were not 
actually very important for Russian interests. 
Therefore, Crimea has rationally low utility to 
Russia. Furthermore, Russia’s decision to move 
ahead with the annexation despite warnings 
from its biggest international trading partners 
shows that decision-makers did not rationally 
weigh the costs and benefits of success. Thus, 
Russian decision-making around the annexation 
does not reflect the third tenet of EUT.
 While planning to reclaim Crimea began 
three weeks before the referendum during an all-
night meeting with security advisors is initially 
consistent with the second tenet of EUT
13Fischer, Ewa and Rogoza, Jadwiga. “A Bottomless Pit: The Costs of Crimea’s Annexation by Russia,” Center for Eastern Studies 
(2014),n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
14Adomanis, Mark. “Vladimir Putin’s Approval Rating is Still Holding Steady,” Forbes (2013), n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
15“Barack Obama’s Yearly Job Approval Averages,” Gallup (2014), n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
16Clemente,Jude. “How Much Energy Does Russia Have Anyways?,” Forbes (2015), n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
17Yablokova, Alina “Crimea in painful transition one year after referendum,” Global Risk Insights (March 29, 2015), n.p., accessed 
November 10, 2015.
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giving Mr. Putin and his advisors the benefit of 
the doubt that they strategically considered their 
plan), failing to adapt from the point that the 
international community warned Russia forward 
fails to reflect this axiom.18 President Putin failed 
to consider the potential negative effects of the 
economic sanctions before continuing with the 
plan to bring Crimea back into Russia. This is 
not consistent with the second axiom of EUT be-
cause it increases the cost of Russia’s first prefer-
ence (annexation) and Russia failed to choose an 
alternative, transitively ranked preference.
 However, later actions are more consis-
tent with this second tenet of EUT. While not 
initially adapting to the threat of economic 
sanctions, the negotiations on the Ukrainian 
conflict in Minsk, Belarus in February 2015 
does appear to align with the EUT notion that 
actors will pursue transitively ranked pref-
erences. In exchange for the resumption of 
economic relations (this does not mean an end 
to the sanctions, however), Russia agreed to a 
ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, the withdrawal of 
weapons, and Ukrainian control of the border 
by the end of 2015.19 Such negotiations as the 
Minsk Agreement appear in accordance with 
EUT. Russia eventually realized the cost of its 
actions outweighed the benefits, and therefore 
Russia decided to enter negotiations to move 
towards a less desired, but overall more bene-
ficial option. Adapting to the situation appears 
consistent with the transitively-ranked prefer-
ences component of EUT. 
 However, analysis also indicates that 
Russia never fully considered the utility of its 
actions, the fifth tenet of EUT. Objectively, 
Crimea provides very little benefit to Russia 
and comes with a very high price tag. In 2014, 
Russia spent 125 billion rubles on Crimea. In 
2016, the country announced plans to invest 680 
billion rubles in Crimea by 2020.20 On top of this 
expense, Russia faces the damaging effects of 
the economic sanctions. Russia’s GDP fell 3.7% 
in 2015 and while the county did experience 
some growth in 2016, it has still not recovered to 
its pre-sanctions GDP.21 Additionally, inflation 
is rising and the value of the ruble is dropping. 
Combined with Russia’s ban on food imports 
form the EU and U.S. (in retaliation of the sanc-
tions), has caused a sharp increase in the price 
of food.22 Failing to consider the costs of annex-
ation and properly weigh the negligible benefits 
is inconsistent with the fourth and fifth axioms 
of EUT. President Putin and his advisors did not 
consider potential outcomes by examining both 
the utility of the outcome and the probability of 
success, nor did they select the option with the 
greatest expected utility. 
 Generally, an examination of Russian 
decision-making behavior seems very inconsis-
tent with the central axioms of EUT.  Therefore, 
EUT does not appear to be a good explanation 
of Russian decision-making behavior regarding 
sanctions and the annexation of Crimea. 
Applied Prospect Theory
Prospect theory, as an alternative to expected 
utility theory, allows for decision-makers to act 
outside of strictly rational thought. With re pect 
to Russian decision making vis-à-vis the economic
18Kondrashov, Andrey. “Crimea: The Way Home – EN Subtitles – Full Documentary,” Vimeo video, March 25, 2015, accessed 
November 18, 2015. https://vimeo.com/123194285; Neil MacFarquar, “Early Memo Urged Moscow to Annex Crimea, Report 
Says,” The New York Times, 2015, n.p.
19Weaver, Matthew and Luhn, Alec. “Ukraine ceasefire agreed at Belarus talks,” The Guardian, 2015, n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
20Makarenko, Olena.“Crimea’s economy: When Russia’s words and figures don’t meet,” Euromaiden Press (Ukraine), May 17, 
2016, n.p., accessed February 21, 2017.
21World Bank Group, “Russian Federation,” The World Bank, accessed February 22, 2017.
22Birnbaum,Michael. “A year into a conflict with Russia, are sanctions working?,” The Washington Post (2015), n.p., accessed 
November 18, 2015.
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sanctions and Crimea, there are several compo-
nents that one would expect to see when using 
prospect theory as a framework. First, one 
would expect Russian perception of reality to 
play a bigger role in decision-making processes 
than objective, rational thought. The fear of loss 
would also play a role in explaining Russian 
actions. This loss aversion would also lead to 
the over-valuation of “possessions.” Finally, one 
would also expect to see framing of choices in 
terms of gains or losses. These concepts, applied 
to key events and speeches, appear useful in 
understanding Russian decision-making behav-
ior around the economic sanctions.
 The idea of loss has surrounded much of 
President Putin’s rhetoric regarding the an-
nexation of Crimea. If consistent with PT, this 
loss aversion would also lead to the over-valua-
tion of possessions. Per Rudy and Venteicher,
States are willing to fight to defend the
same territory they would not fight to 
acquire in the first place. In such cases,
states fight to defend their territory because
they value it more due primarily to the fact
that they own/control the land (as suggested
by the endowment effect), and possible
losses generates more risk acceptant behavior
due to loss aversion.23
In this case, Crimea is the “overvalued pos-
session” that Russia is willing to accept risk 
and potential loss to defend. Since Crimea is 
historically Russian territory, Putin views it 
as rightfully belonging to the Russian Federa-
tion rather than Ukraine.24 This is consistent 
with Russia’s willingness to spend billions on 
the tiny peninsula while also struggling due to 
economic sanctions. 
A Standard and Poor’s estimate claims 
Russia would have to pour approximately one 
billion dollars into Crimea annually to bring 
the living standard up to Russian standards. 
Furthermore, Crimea needs most of its energy, 
drinking water, and food imported. In addition 
to the costs of merely maintaining Crimea, 
there are also costs associated with integrat-
ing it into the Russian Federation. This cou-
pled with a steep decline in Crimea’s tourism 
industry – the largest sector of the Crimean 
economy – makes the cost of Crimea substan-
tial.25 Despite this cost, Vladimir Putin main-
tains his position on Crimea, clearly stating, 
“I believe we did the right thing and I don’t 
regret anything.”26 He claims the annexation 
righted a historical wrong – namely, that 
Crimea always belonged to Russia rather than 
Ukraine.27 The massive amount of money and 
resources Russia is willing to pour into a tiny 
peninsula in the Black Sea appears rationally 
disproportional. The endowment effect helps 
to explain the motivation behind such a risky 
action. This is particularly evident in Presi-
dent Putin’s justifications for the annexation 
because Crimea is historically part of Russia. 
This is also an example of loss aversion be-
cause Mr. Putin’s justification for the annex-
ation deals directly with Russia’s historical 
possession of Crimea. This is consistent with 
the first and third tenets of PT.
According to PT, the desperation to repos-
sess Crimea makes Russia risk-seeking. The 
willingness to endure economic hardship to
23Rudy, Michael A. and Venteicher,Jerome F. “Prospect Theory and Economic Sanctions: Towards a Theory of Economic 
Coersion,” presented at Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2006): 11, accessed November 9, 2015.
24Kottasova, Ivana. “Sanctions will cost Russia more than $100 billion,” CNN (2015): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
25Fischer and Rogoza, “The costs of Crimea’s annexation,” n.p.
26Neuman, Scott. “Putin: ‘No Regrets’ Over Crimea Annexation,” NPR (2015): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
27Meyers, Steven Lee and Barry, Ellen. “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West,” The New York 
Times (2014): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
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hold on to Crimea already reflects some risky 
behavior. Russia not only consistently stands 
behind the actions that led to the sanctions 
in the first place, but encourages similar 
actions in other historically Russian regions. 
Shortly before the one-year anniversary of the 
Crimean annexation, President Putin signed 
an agreement to create a common security 
space and open boarder with South Ossetia, 
a breakaway region of Georgia. Critics of this 
arrangement equate it with a Russian annex-
ation of South Ossetia. Russia also supports 
the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk in 
eastern Ukraine.28 These actions all share 
similarities with the actions that led to the 
sanctions in the first place. This demonstrates 
risk-seeking behavior, which suggests that PT 
offers a fitting explanation regarding Russia’s 
framing of the situation in terms of potential 
loss of Crimea. This risk-seeking behavior 
reflects the second precept of PT.
 Additionally, PT would also expect to 
see framing of choices in terms of gains or 
losses. This is evident in the Russian fram-
ing of the situation to fear the loss of Crimea 
more than loss from economic sanctions. As 
discussed above, Putin already frames loss of 
Crimea is a terrible injustice. The economic 
consequences of the sanctions, however, do 
not receive an equally negative framing. On 
the one-year anniversary of the annexation, 
marked by a huge celebration in Moscow, 
Putin acknowledged that the sanctions are 
“not fatal, but naturally damage our ongoing 
work.”29 He went on to argue that the sanc-
tions are worth any ensuing struggle because 
of what Russia would lose if it submitted to 
the coercion of the sanctions. In his speech, 
frames this potential loss by saying, “The 
issue at stake was the sources of our histo-
ry, our spirituality and our statehood – the 
things that make us a single people, and a 
single, united nation.”30 Putin’s statement 
reflects an awareness of the harmful effects of 
the sanctions. However, by referring to Rus-
sia’s “ongoing work,” he also alludes to the 
notion that Russia is not willing to change its 
policy to bring an end to the sanctions. Putin 
therefore frames loss from economic sanctions 
as second to the potential loss of Crimea. 
Thus, the possession of Crimea is Russia’s 
point of reference and Russia fears losing 
Crimea a second time in this instance. This is 
consistent with the fourth tenet of PT.
 On the other hand, Russia also faces 
potential harm from the international com-
munity’s sanctions. Since Russia fears losing 
Crimea, they risk economic harm from these 
sanctions. This harm manifested in sev-
eral ways since the implementation of the 
sanctions, including a credit rating cut from 
Standard & Poor’s, a steep devaluation of 
the ruble, inflation, a decline in foreign in-
vestment, falling bond prices, a reduction in 
economic growth, and a rise in geopolitical 
tensions.31 The desperation to prevent the loss 
of Crimea, combined with the high-probabil-
ity of loss due to the economic sanctions and 
international pressure places Russia in the 
upper left quadrant of the graph in Figure 
1.  Forgoing objective and rational thought 
through the evident overvaluation of Crimea 
and the underweighting of potential harm 
from the sanctions is consistent with the fifth 
rule of PT. Prospect Theory’s framework for
28Herszenhorn, David M. “A Year After Seizing Crimea, Putin Celebrates as Ukraine Seethes,” The New York Times (March 18, 
2015): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
29“Crimea annexation: Putin admits sanctions ‘damaging,’” BBC News (2015): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
31Herszenhorn, “A Year After Seizing Crimea,” n.p.
31Philips, Matt. “S&P says Russia’s Crimea caper has already hurt the economy,” Quartz (2014): n.p., accessed November 18, 2015.
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decision-making appears to offer a useful 
explanation for understanding Russian 
decision-making behavior in this case. Loss 
aversion and the endowment effect describe 
why Russia so adamantly seeks to keep and 
support a territory that offers it such little 
benefit in return, even in the face of risking 
high financial loss. Moreover, it also offers 
an explanation for Russian risk-seeking be-
havior in similar situations since the imple-
mentation of the sanctions. 
Towards a Better Understanding
In this case, PT offers a more useful un-
derstanding of Russian decision-making 
behavior than EUT. With respect to the 
sanctions meant to coerce Russia into chang-
ing its behavior toward Crimea, rational 
decision-making does not appear evident, as 
Russia celebrates the annexation of a region 
with no noteworthy benefits, despite signif-
icant negative financial effects of the sanc-
tions. However, President Putin’s rhetoric 
shows that he does not frame the situation 
in terms of logical net gains, but rather in 
terms of the potential loss of Crimea – a Rus-
sian “possession.” Russia is willing to risk 
the financial harm of the sanctions because 
it fears losing Crimea. This is more consis-
tent with the framework PT offers for under-
standing decision-making behavior than that 
of EUT. 
Conclusion
Prospect Theory offers the clearest expla-
nation for understanding Russian foreign 
policy decision-making behavior vis-à-vis 
the economic sanctions and the annexation 
of Crimea. This contributes to a comprehen-
sion of how states respond to sanctions. In 
the case of economic sanctions on Russia, PT 
explains how Russia is willing to accept high 
financial costs to prevent the loss of Crimea. 
However, it is also important to note the lim-
itations of this study. As the sanctions are 
relatively new, it is difficult to fully assess 
their complete effects at this point in time.
 Prospect Theory offers the clearest ex-
planation for understanding Russian foreign 
policy decision-making behavior vis-à-vis 
the economic sanctions and the annexation 
of Crimea. This contributes to a comprehen-
sion of how states respond to sanctions. In 
the case of economic sanctions on Russia, PT 
explains how Russia is willing to accept high 
financial costs to prevent the loss of Crimea. 
However, it is also important to note the lim-
itations of this study. As the sanctions are 
relatively new, it is difficult to fully assess 
their complete effects at this point in time.
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